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Introduction 
 
In May 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court ordered the State of California to release 30,000 to 
40,000 of its 140,000 inmates.2 California’s prisons have become so overcrowded that the 
Supreme Court declared the situation unconstitutional. The decision was imminent. For 
nearly two decades, California, along with many other states, was busy getting ‘tough on 
crime’. In the early 1990s, the state enacted the ‘Three-Strikes Law’, which mandates life 
sentences for third-time serious crime offenders, and it pursued the country’s ‘war on drugs’ 
and other law-enforcement campaigns with increasing zeal. Soon enough, its prisons were 
overflowing at nearly twice their capacity.  
The United States is often portrayed as the archetypical liberal model. It is the world’s 
largest, most prosperous ‘free market’ and the greatest generator of profit on earth. And yet 
this very liberal haven is also the largest penal system in the world. There are now more than 
two million inmates in its prisons and jails and another five million on probation and on 
parole. If you add these two numbers together, you get a ‘correctional population’ of over 
seven million. This correctional population is the largest in the world – both absolutely and 
relative to the overall population – and it is also the largest the country has ever seen. 
To some, this combination of market prosperity and intense punishment may seem 
puzzling  expect crime and punishment to correlate with poverty, 
backwar be a feature of the Third World, not the First.  
. Many people intuitively
dness and deprivation; to 
                                                        
1 Shimshon Bichler teaches political economy at colleges and universities in Israel. Jonathan Nitzan 
teaches political economy at York University in Toronto. All of their publications are available from 
The Bichler & Nitzan Archives (bnarchives.net). 
 
 
2 Supreme Court of the United States. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor of California, et al., Appellants v. 
Marciano Plata et al. 563 U. S._ (2011). On Appeal from the United States District Courts for the Eastern 
District and the Northern District of California, May 23, 2012; Adam Liptak, ‘Justices, 5-4, Tell Cali-
fornia to Cut Prisoner Population’, The New York Times, May 23, 2012. 
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Knowingly or not, this expectation is grounded in the conventional separation of 
production from state and capital from power. According to the liberal version of this 
separation, accumulation breeds economic prosperity, and prosperity in the economic sphere 
reduces crime and calls for less punishment in the socio-political sphere. However, if we 
discard this separation and instead think of capital as power, and of capitalism as a mode of 
power, the puzzle disappears. The greater the capitalization of power, the greater the 
resistance to that capitalization and the larger the force needed to prevent this resistance from 
exploding. As profits increase to make distribution more unequal, the result is mounting 
resistance from below, and this resistance in turn leads to retaliation from above. The rising 
crime and intensifying punishment that we now see in the United States are key 
manifestations of this dialectic of capitalized resistance and retaliation.  
 
The Questions 
 
The purpose of this presentation is to examine the issue of crime and punishment within the 
larger context of capitalized power, and specifically in relation to the limits of such power.  
This exploration continues the line of argument we developed in two previous Forums 
held here at York. In the 2010 Forum, we introduced the concepts of systemic crisis and 
systemic fear. We claimed that the current crisis – which started not in 2008 but in 2000 – is 
systemic, and that capitalists are now concerned not so much about employment, production 
or even profit, but the very survival of their system.3 
Then, in the 2011 Forum, we examined the ‘Asymptotes of Power’.  
Capitalists in general and dominant capitalists in particular, we argued, have objective 
reasons to fear for their system. We showed that the present distribution of income-read-
power – ranging from the most aggregate indicators of the national accounts down to the 
differential earnings of dominant capital – is pushing against its class limits. And we 
suggested that, if the pushing continues, it could trigger systemic collapse.4 
The goal of today’s presentation is to examine the darker side of this struggle. In the past, 
resistance to capital was associated with production, workers, left political parties, strikes and 
mass demonstrations. But as the world changed, new forms of resistance and retaliation have 
emerged, and the ones we will look at today are crime and punishment. We will start with the 
two charts that ended last year’s presentation – charts in which we related the distribution of 
income and capital on the one hand with the extent of state punishment on the other.  
Figure 1 shows the income share of the top 10 per cent of the U.S. population. This share 
offers a proxy, however imperfect, for the power of the ruling class and the thick power belt 
that supports it. The shaded areas in the figure denote two historical extremes – periods 
during which the income share of the top 10 per cent of the population exceeded 45 per cent. 
During the 1930s, this share approached 47 per cent of total income. And in retrospect, that 
level proved to be the asymptote of capitalist power. Pushing against it triggered a systemic 
crisis, followed by the complete creordering of the U.S. political economy and a sharp decline 
y a large drop in income inequality. The situation now is in capitalist power, proxied here b
                                                        
3 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, ‘Systemic Fear, Modern Finance and the Future of Capital-
ism’, Monograph, Jerusalem and Montreal, July 2010, pp. 1-42; Andrew Kliman, Shimshon Bichler 
and Jonathan Nitzan ‘Systemic Crisis, Systemic Fear: An Exchange’, Special Issue on ‘Crisis’, Journal of 
Critical Globalization Studies, No. 4, April, 2011, pp. 61-118. 
4 Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan, ‘The Asymptotes of Power’, Real-World Economics Review, No. 
60, June, 2012, pp. 18-53. 
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remarkably similar, both quantitatively and qualitatively. During the 2000s, the income share 
controlled by the top 10 per cent of the population approached 48 per cent, a level whose 
attainment and sustainment required the ruling class to subject the underlying population to 
increasing doses of violence, pain and sabotage.  
 
Figure 1 
Income Share of the Top 10% of the U.S. Population 
www.bnarchives.net
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: Income is defined as ‘market income’, including capital 
gains; it excludes government transfers. Grey areas indicate periods 
during which the 5-year moving average of the data series exceeded 
45%. The last data point is for 2010.  
 
SOURCE: The World Top Incomes Database 
http://g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/topincomes/ (retrieved 
on September 19, 2012).  
 
 
Figure 2 illustrates one key manifestation of this process – and the difficulty of sustaining 
it. The chart reproduces the distributional measure from Figure 1 and contrasts this measure 
with the adult ‘correctional population’, expressed as a share of the overall population. The 
correctional population comprises adults in prison, in jail, on probation and on parole. And 
as the chart shows, the ‘correctional’ share of the population is tightly and positively 
correlated with the distributional power of the ruling class: the greater the power, the larger 
the dose of violence inflicted on the underlying population. Presently, almost 2.5 per cent of 
the U.S. population is under some sort of institutional punishment – which, as indicated, is 
the largest proportion in the world and highest in the country’s history. Although there are no 
hard and fast rules here, it is doubtful that this massive punishment can be increased much 
further without highly destabilizing consequences. The 2011 Supreme Court order to release 
30,000 to 40,000 prisoners is perhaps a sign that the ruling class is apprehensive of such a 
destabilization; and the apparent peak in both income inequality and the correctional 
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population suggests that capitalist power may be approaching its asymptotes and that a 
systemic reversal could be in the offing.  
 
Figure 2 
U.S. Income Distribution and the Correctional Population 
www.bnarchives.net
(share of the overall population, right)
(left)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The correctional population consists of adults in prison, in 
jail, on probation and on parole. For years prior to 1980, systematic 
data are available only for adults in prison and jail. For those earlier 
years, the total correctional population is estimated in two steps: 
first, by computing the average ratio between the total correctional 
population and the number of adults in prison and jail during the 
period 1980-1989 (=5.98); and second, by multiplying for each year 
the number of adults in prison and jail by this average ratio. The last 
data points are for 2010.  
 
SOURCE: The income share of the top 10% of the population is 
from The World Top Incomes Database 
http://g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/topincomes/ (retrieved 
on September 19, 2012). Data on the correctional population are 
from Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online (till 1979: 
Table 6.28.2009 
(http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/csv/t6282009.csv); from 
1980 onward: Table 6.1.2010 
(http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/csv/t612010.csv). Popula-
tion data till 1929 are from the Historical Statistics of the United States: 
Earliest Times to the Present, Millennial Edition (online) (series code: 
Aa7); from 1930 onward, the data are from the U.S. Bureau of the 
Census through Global Insight (series code: N@US). 
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Figure 3 
U.S. Correctional Population as  
a Share of the Overall Population 
www.bnarchives.net
(left)
(right)
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The correctional population consists of adults in prison, in 
jail, on probation and on parole. For years prior to 1980, systematic 
data are available only for adults in prison and jail. For those earlier 
years, the total correctional population is estimated in two steps: 
first, by computing the average ratio between the total correctional 
population and the number of adults in prison and jail during the 
period 1980-1989 (=5.98); and second, by multiplying for each year 
the number of adults in prison and jail by this average ratio. The last 
data points are for 2010.  
 
SOURCE: Data on the correctional population are from Source-
book of Criminal Justice Statistics Online (till 1979: Table 
6.28.2009 
(http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/csv/t6282009.csv); from 
1980 onward: Table 6.1.2010 
(http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/csv/t612010.csv). Popula-
tion data till 1929 are from the Historical Statistics of the United States: 
Earliest Times to the Present, Millennial Edition (online) (series code: 
Aa7); from 1930 onward, the data are from the U.S. Bureau of the 
Census through Global Insight (series code: N@US). 
 
 
Now, let us focus on the correctional population. In Figure 3, the black series at the 
bottom denotes the correctional population as a share of the overall population (which we 
take from Figure 2). The top red series shows the annual rate of change of the bottom series. 
Historically, this rate of change has fluctuated between −10 and +10 per cent, and the 
question we need to ask is what drives these changes: Why did the correctional population 
remain fairly stable till the late 1970s? Why did is soar during much of the neoliberal 1980s 
and 1990s? And why did it level off in the 2000s?  
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Georg Rusche 
 
Until the 1930s, these types of questions were never asked, let alone answered. The subject of 
crime and punishment was studied mostly by novelists, legal experts, doctors, psychologists, 
philosophers and moralists. It was rarely if ever dealt with by political economists, and it was 
certainly never studied scientifically. 
The first to undertake this type of study was the German political economist Georg 
Rusche.5 Rusche was born in 1900 and received his PhD in economics in the mid 1920s. He 
was interested in labour economics, and he also became involved in prison work. This 
background led him to contemplate the connection between punishment and the labour 
market. In the early 1930s, he was commissioned by the Frankfurt School to write a book on 
the subject, and in 1933 he produced a short article, titled ‘Labor Market and Penal Sanction’, 
where he spelled out his thesis. Six years later, in 1939, he published, together with Otto 
Kircheimmer, the full manuscript, titled Punishment and Social Structure.6 
According to Rusche, crime and punishment were too important to be left out of political 
economy. They needed to be anchored in economic theory, he said, and they had to be 
embedded in the evolution of class relations and class conflict. What were the basic 
propositions the researcher should start from? Rusche offered four. 
 
 The first proposition – which today may sound like a liberal triviality – concerned the 
goal of the penal system. Crime consists of acts forbidden by society, and one of the 
purposes of the penal system, Rusche posited, is to limit and reduce those acts.  
 
 The second proposition – which nowadays may ring like a mainstream cliché, but back in 
the 1930s sat well with the materialist emphasis of Marxist analysis – had to do with 
Bentham’s ‘calculus of pleasure and pain’. In order to deter crime, the penal system needs 
to convince people that ‘crime doesn’t pay’; in modern economic parlance, we would say 
that it needs to make the expected pain from punishment greater than the expected gains 
from crime. 
 
 The third proposition identifies what we may call the ‘asymptotes of penality’. Most 
people disposed to crime come from the lower strata of society, where the conditions of 
life are the hardest. This fact means that in order to deter crime, the penal sanction must 
be worse than the living conditions of these lower strata. ‘If the prison doesn’t underbid 
the slum in human misery’, Rusche quotes Bernard Shaw, ‘the slum will empty and the 
prison will fill’.7 In other words, the lowest living conditions in society set the upper limit 
of the penal system. 
 
 
affect the living conditio
                                                       
The fourth and final proposition concerned the rate of unemployment. Many factors 
ns of the lower strata, says Rusche. But the most important by far 
 
5 Rusche’s biographical sketch in this paragraph draws on Dario Melossi, ‘A New Edition of Punishment 
and Social Structure Thirty-Five Years Later: A Timely Event’, Social Justice, Vol. 30, No. 1, Spring, 2003, 
pp. 248-263. 
6 Georg Rusche, ‘Labor Market and Penal Sanction: Thoughts on the Sociology of Criminal Justice’, 
Translated by Gerda Dinwiddie, Crime and Social Justice, No. 10, Fall-Winter, 1978 (originally published 
in 1933); Georg Rusche and Otto Kirchheimer, Punishment and Social Structure, with a new introduction 
by Dario Melossi, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2003 (originally published in 1939). 
7 Rusche, 1933, p. 4. 
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is the labour market, and particularly the ‘excess supply/demand’ for labour, or the rate 
of unemployment. When there is ‘excess supply’, unemployment rises and wages decline, 
causing crime to increase and punishment to intensify. And when there is ‘excess 
demand’ and unemployment decreases, the opposite process is set in motion. 
 
These observations, which Rusche says hold in every society, set the general boundaries of 
penality: 
 
 When labour is abundant, deprivation is close to its limits, so the unemployed can be 
deterred from crime only by the ultimate punishment: death. Rusche gives the example of 
China, where a huge reserve army of unemployed makes human life worth close to noth-
ing. Under those conditions, he observes, it is common for captured criminals to be exe-
cuted without much fuss.  
 
 By contrast, when labour is scarce and there are not enough workers to fill all the jobs, 
the penal system shifts toward reform and exploitation. The goal now is not to prevent 
the hungry from criminal acts, but to convince unwilling labourers and criminals that 
they need to be working. This situation, says Rusche, existed for example during the Eu-
ropean Enlightenment of the seventeenth century, when ‘excess demand’ for labour ush-
ered in by the Mercantilist Era brought prison reforms. Moreover, since ‘excess demand’ 
for workers drives wages up, it became profitable to lock up criminals and use them as 
forced labour, and that too was a feature of European Mercantilism. All in all, a tight la-
bour market causes the system to move from execution to exploitation.  
 
Now these are the two logical extremes: death on the one hand, penal reform and forced 
labour on the other. A political economy of crime and punishment, says Rusche, needs to 
start from this analytical skeleton and then flesh out the real historical process that Disraeli 
referred to as the ‘two nations’ and Marx called the ‘class struggle’. The first person to offer 
such analysis was Rusche. 
Rusche’s own work was largely historical and comparative. He went through a series of 
epochs, examining in each case (1) the conditions of the labour market; (2) the nature of 
crime; and (3) the intensity of punishment. And what he found was largely consistent with his 
hypothesis. 
 
 During the early Middle Ages, land was abundant and the population sparse. Most crime 
was about passion rather than property, and punishment usually took the form of 
revenge, penance or monetary fines. 
 
 In the late Middle Ages, land grew scarcer and the population more abundant. There 
were peasant wars and social unrest, and armies of beggars became commonplace. 
Property crime and robbery were on the rise, but criminals were often unable to pay, so 
punishment grew crueler and execution more common. 
 
 During the Mercantilist period, roughly the seventeenth century, wars, hunger and 
plagues reduced the population, while trade raised the demand for workers. Labour 
became scarcer and wages increased. It was in this context that the Enlightenment 
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movement made punishment more humane and that imprisonment emerged as a new 
venue to exploit forced labour. 
 
 In the Industrial Revolution, roughly the eighteenth century, mechanization made 
workers abundant, wages fell and the reserve army of the unemployed swelled. Forced 
labour was no longer necessary, and prison conditions became punitive and grew 
harsher. 
 
 In America till the late nineteenth century, rapid industrial development, abundant land 
and a relatively small population made labour scarce and wages high. The crime scene 
accorded with Rusche’s hypothesis: criminal offences were low; prison reform was in full 
swing; conditional sentences, parole and probation were increasingly used; and scientists 
began to study the causes of crime and how welfare policies can abate them. 
 
 Rusche also provided an interesting comparison between the United States and Germany 
during the 1930s. In America, he said, massive unemployment and weak unions drove 
wages down, causing the penal system to become more overcrowded, brutal and 
repressive. In Germany, in contrast, the presence of strong labour unions mitigated the 
decline of wages and helped moderate penal sanctions.  
 
 Finally, Rusche was also prescient in predicting the use of concentration camps to solve 
the labour shortages created by the rearmament drives of totalitarian regimes.  
 
The Puzzle 
 
Rusche himself received little recognition in his lifetime and committed suicide in 1950. 
Although he offered a very impressive starting point for what was then a totally new 
approach, for a long time his work remained largely unknown and did not make it to the 
mainstream of either criminology or sociology, let alone political economy.  
It was only in the 1980s, with soaring U.S. crime and the massive increase in 
incarceration, that his approach finally gained some traction, particularly in the critical 
literature. Also, there were now more systematic data to study, and with computing 
becoming cheaper, critical sociologists and radical criminologists started to subject Rushe’s 
hypotheses to various empirical investigations.  
But then there arose a puzzle. Whereas Rusche’s long-term historical hypotheses seemed 
to shed light on various epochs and lead to derivative theses and theories, the conclusions 
from shorter-term analyses, particularly of contemporary Western societies, were more 
ambiguous.  
The breakdown happened around the 1980s. The central axis of Rusche’s argument is 
that penality should be positively correlated with ‘excess supply’ in the labour market. Most 
researchers take the rate of unemployment as the key proxy for ‘excess supply’ of labour and 
the share of the overall population under ‘correction’ as the proxy for penality. These two 
proxies are plotted in Figure 4 – unemployment on the left scale and the correctional 
population on the right. Now, the chart shows that until the early 1980s the two proxies were 
correlated positively (though by no means tightly). However, from the early 1980s onward, 
this correlation breaks down completely. With Ronald Reagan in office and neoliberalism in 
full swing, unemployment declined – yet the correctional population went vertical. On the 
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face of it, then, it would seem that the Rusche thesis was loosely valid until the beginning of 
neoliberalism, but not afterwards.  
 
Figure 4 
U.S. Unemployment and the Correctional Population 
www.bnarchives.net
(share of the overall
population, right)
(share of the civilian
labour force, left)
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The correctional population consists of adults in prison, in 
jail, on probation and on parole. Prior to 1980, systematic data are 
available only for adults in prison and jail. For those earlier years, 
the total correctional population is estimated in two steps: first, by 
computing the average ratio between the total correctional popula-
tion and the number of adults in prison and jail during the period 
1980-1989 (=5.91); and second, by multiplying for each year the 
number of adults in prison and jail by this average ratio. The last 
data points are 2010 for the correctional population and 2012 for 
unemployment. 
 
SOURCE: Data on the correctional population are from Source-
book of Criminal Justice Statistics Online (till 1979: Table 
6.28.2009 
(http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/csv/t6282009.csv); from 
1980 onward: Table 6.1.2010 
(http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/csv/t612010.csv). Popula-
tion data till 1929 are from the Historical Statistics of the United States: 
Earliest Times to the Present, Millennial Edition (online) (series code: 
Aa7); from 1930 onward, the data are from the U.S. Bureau of the 
Census through Global Insight (series code: N@US). Unemploy-
ment till 1947 is from Historical Statistics of the United States: Earliest 
Times to the Present, Millennial Edition (online) (series code: Ba457); 
from 1948, data are from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
through Global Insight (series code: RUC@US). 
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Re-search 
 
In our view, though, this would be a hasty conclusion to draw. It seems to us that, at any 
point in time, penality should be proxied not by the overall level of the correctional 
population, but by its rate of change. The reason is simple. The overall level of the 
correctional population is determined by two factors: (1) the cumulative results of past crime 
and punishment; and (2) current crime and punishment that cause this cumulative result to 
increase or decrease. The current rate of unemployment affects only the second of these 
factors; it influences not the past levels of crime and punishment, but their current rate of 
change.  
Figure 5 reflects this shift in emphasis, and the effect is dramatic. The figure shows the 
same rate of unemployment as in Figure 4. But penality now is proxied not by the level of the 
correctional population relative to the overall population, but the annual rate of change of 
this ratio. There are two important things to note in this chart. 
 
 We can see that, for much of the past century, changes in the U.S. correctional 
population were almost perfectly ‘explained’, at least statistically, by changes in the rate 
of unemployment. Rusche was right – indeed more right than he could have anticipated. 
According to the figure, there is no need for complicated models, multiple variables and 
assorted excuses (when the models fail). The two forms of sabotage – unemployment and 
penality – mirror each other almost perfectly.  
 
 But there are two important exceptions to the rule – the first occurred during the Great 
Depression of 1930s, the second in the present crisis. During both of these systemic 
crises, which the chart shades in grey, the two series are not positively, but negative 
correlated. In both, unemployment rises sharply – but penality, instead of soaring in 
tandem, decelerates sharply or actually falls. 
 
So we have an enigma. If our interpretation of Rusche is correct, then what explains the 
decoupling of unemployment and penality during systemic crises? Is this a mere coincidence, 
or do systemic crises alter the underlying relationship of the two processes? We return to this 
enigma at the end of the presentation. 
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Figure 5 
U.S. Unemployment and the Correctional Population 
www.bnarchives.net
(annual rate of change, right)
(share of the civilian
labour force, left)
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The correctional population consists of adults in prison, in 
jail, on probation and on parole. For years prior to 1980, systematic 
data are available only for adults in prison and jail. For those earlier 
years, the total correctional population is estimated in two steps: 
first, by computing the average ratio between the total correctional 
population and the number of adults in prison and jail during the 
period 1980-1989 (=5.91); and second, by multiplying for each year 
the number of adults in prison and jail by this average ratio. The last 
data points are 2010 for the correctional population and 2012 for 
unemployment. 
 
SOURCE: Data on the correctional population are from Source-
book of Criminal Justice Statistics Online (till 1979: Table 
6.28.2009 
(http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/csv/t6282009.csv); from 
1980 onward: Table 6.1.2010 
(http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/csv/t612010.csv). Popula-
tion data till 1929 are from the Historical Statistics of the United States: 
Earliest Times to the Present, Millennial Edition (online) (series code: 
Aa7); from 1930 onward, the data are from the U.S. Bureau of the 
Census through Global Insight (series code: N@US). Unemploy-
ment till 1947 is from Historical Statistics of the United States: Earliest 
Times to the Present, Millennial Edition (online) (series code: Ba457); 
from 1948, data are from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
through Global Insight (series code: RUC@US). 
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Decompose 
 
Let us try to make sense of these two observations. The first step is to decompose the rate of 
change of the correctional population. Consider Equation (1), where the dots on top of the 
variables indicate temporal rates of change. In this equation, the rate of change of the share of 
the correctional population in the overall population is approximately equal to the rate of 
change of the correctional population less the rate of change of the overall population. 
 
1. 






populationoverallpopulationalcorrection
populationoverall
populationalcorrection
 
 
Now, if the rate of change of the overall population is fairly stable, variations in the share of 
the correctional population in the overall population (the left-hand side of the equation) will 
be dominated by the rate of change of the correctional population (first element on the right).  
So let’s decompose the rate of change of the correctional population. Mathematically, 
this rate of change comprises three components: (1) the intensity of punishment, proxied by 
the change in the correctional population relative to crime; (2) the crime rate, measured by 
the ratio of crime to the overall population; and (3) the correctional population as a share of 
the overall population. The decomposition is given by Equation (2): 
  
2. 
populationalcorrection
populationalcorrectionpopulationalcorrection   
 
    
populationalcorrection
populationoverall
populationoverall
crime
crime
populationalcorrection   
 
    
populationoveralltheofshareaaspopulationalcorrection
ratecrimepunishmentofintensity   
 
 
Crime and Punishment 
  
Let us look more closely at the numerator of the third line of Equation (2), beginning with the 
crime rate. Figure 6 shows the historical evolution of what the FBI calls the ‘serious crime 
rate’. Serious crimes include criminal homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, 
burglary, larceny-theft and motor-vehicle theft.8 The FBI collects these statistics from various 
sources, standardizes them and expresses them as a ratio to the overall population. For 
example, in 2010, the serious crime rate was 334 for every 10,000 people, or 3.3 per cent. 
Note the cyclicality of the serious crime rate. It rose from its nadir of 2 per cent in 1960 to a 
peak of 6 per cent in 1980. At that point, criminologists, social commentators and politicians 
thought that all hell was breaking loose, that the crime rate was likely to shoot through the 
                                                        
8 U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics, 
UCR Offense Definitions.  
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roof, and that the social fabric of the U.S. was about to disintegrate.9 None of these 
predictions have materialized. Instead of rising, the crime rate started a long-term decline, 
and by 2010 it was half as high as it was in 1980.  
 
Figure 6 
U.S. Serious Crime and Murder Rates (per 10,000 persons) 
www.bnarchives.net
(right)
(left)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The serious crime rate consists of Part I Index Crimes of 
the FBI Unified Crime Reporting (UCR) expressed in relation to 
the overall population. Part I Index Crimes include criminal homi-
cide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-
theft and motor-vehicle theft. The last data points are for 2010. 
 
SOURCE: The number of murders is from Historical Statistics of the 
United States: Earliest Times to the Present, Millennial Edition (online) 
(series code: Ec191 for 1900-1932 and Ec22 for 1933-1959); and 
from UCR Online 
(http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/Search/Crime/State/StateCrime.cf
m for 1960-2005; http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-
the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10tbl01.xls for 2006-
2010). Population data till 1929 are from the Historical Statistics of the 
United States: Earliest Times to the Present, Millennial Edition (online) 
(series code: Aa7); from 1930 onward, the data are from the U.S. 
Bureau of the Census through Global Insight (series code: N@US). 
The serious crime rate (Part I Index Crimes relative to the popula-
tion) is from UCR Online as above. 
 
 
                                                        
9 See for example, Steven D. Levitt, ‘Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that 
Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Winter), 2004, 
pp. 163-190. 
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Unfortunately, we do not have unified serious crime statistics for years prior to 1960. But 
we do have data for the murder rate, depicted here in red. The number of murders of course is 
much smaller that the overall number of serious crimes. In 1980, for instance, for every 
10,000 people there were 600 serious crimes but only one murder. The key for our purposes, 
though, is that the two series are highly correlated. And if this correlation also held prior to 
1960, it implies that the U.S. crime rate has followed a fairly stylized long-term cycle.  
Bearing this cyclicality in mind, we can move to Figure 7. The thick black line in the 
figure measures the serious crime rate per 100 people. The chart also shows the intensity of 
punishment, proxied by the thin red line. If you look at Equation (2), you can see that this 
intensity is measured in two steps. The first step is to compute net change in the correctional 
population. For example, in 2010 the correctional population fell by 157,000. This figure 
represents, for that year, the number of people who were caught, tried and sentenced, less the 
number of those released. For 2010 the net figure was negative – there were more people 
leaving the correctional system than entering it. The second step is to divide this net change 
by the number of serious crimes reported that year and multiply the result by 100. This 
computation gives us the net change in the correctional population per 100 crimes. In 2010, 
this ratio was −1.5, which means that for every 100 serious crimes, there were 1.5 people 
deleted from the correctional population. By contrast, in 1998 the number was +3.2, which 
means that for every 100 serious crimes, there were 3.2 people added to the correctional 
population. Note that this is a ‘composite measure’ that reflects four different processes: (1) 
the efforts and the effectiveness of the police; (2) changes in the legal code; (3) the harshness 
of the courts; and (4) the release rate of those previously sentenced.  
The chart shows that the two measures – crime and the intensity of punishment – are 
tightly correlated. Now, recall that, according to Rusche, crime and punishment are both 
driven by conditions in the labour market – particularly unemployment – so the correlation 
between them suggests we should examine their separate relationships to unemployment. 
Figure 8 shows the relationship between the serious crime rate and the unemployment 
rate since the 1960s. In general, the data seem consistent with Rusche’s hypothesis, at least 
until recently. They show the two processes to be moving in tandem, rising until the 1980s 
and receding afterwards. But by the late 2000s, the relationship between unemployment and 
crime seems to have broken down: while unemployment has risen sharply, the crime rate, 
instead of increasing, has continued to drop.  
Figure 9 shows the relationship between the intensity of punishment and unemployment. 
And the patterns here are similar to those in Figure 7. There is a positive relationship between 
unemployment and the intensity of punishment, with both rising till the 1980s and falling 
afterwards. And here, too, the relationship inverts in the late 2000s: while unemployment 
rises dramatically, the intensity of punishment drops sharply and indeed becomes negative. 
Note that the short-term correlation since the 1980s is looser than before; but even in this 
looser correlation, the divergence between the series in the late 2000s stands out clearly. 
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Figure 7 
U.S. Serious Crime and the Intensity of Punishment 
www.bnarchives.net
(Annual Change in Correctional Population
per 100 serious crimes, right)
(per 100 persons, left)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The serious crime rate consists of Part I Index Crimes of 
the FBI Unified Crime Reporting (UCR) expressed in relation to 
the overall population. Part I Index Crimes include criminal homi-
cide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-
theft and motor-vehicle theft. The correctional population consists 
of adults in prison, in jail, on probation and on parole. For years 
prior to 1980, systematic data are available only for adults in prison 
and jail. For those earlier years, the total correctional population is 
estimated in two steps: first, by computing the average ratio be-
tween the total correctional population and the number of adults in 
prison and jail during the period 1980-1989 (=5.91); and second, by 
multiplying for each year the number of adults in prison and jail by 
this average ratio. The last data points are for 2010. 
 
SOURCE: The serious crime rate (Part I Index Crimes relative to 
the population) is from UCR Online 
(http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/Search/Crime/State/StateCrime.cf
m for 1960-2005; http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-
the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10tbl01.xls for 2006-
2010). The correctional population is from Sourcebook of Criminal 
Justice Statistics Online (till 1979: Table 6.28.2009 
(http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/csv/t6282009.csv); from 
1980 onward: Table 6.1.2010 
(http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/csv/t612010.csv).  
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Figure 8 
U.S. Unemployment and Serious Crime 
www.bnarchives.net
(per 100 persons, right)
(share of the civilian
labour force, left)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The serious crime rate consists of Part I Index Crimes of 
the FBI Unified Crime Reporting (UCR) expressed in relation to 
the overall population. Part I Index Crimes include criminal homi-
cide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-
theft and motor-vehicle theft. The last data points are 2010 for seri-
ous crime and 2012 for unemployment. 
 
SOURCE: The serious crime rate (Part I Index Crimes relative to 
the population) is from UCR Online 
(http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/Search/Crime/State/StateCrime.cf
m for 1960-2005; http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-
the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10tbl01.xls for 2006-
2010). Unemployment till 1947 is from Historical Statistics of the Unit-
ed States: Earliest Times to the Present, Millennial Edition (online) (series 
code: Ba457); from 1948, data are from the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics through Global Insight (series code: RUC@US). 
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Figure 9 
U.S. Unemployment and the Intensity of Punishment 
www.bnarchives.net
(Annual Change in Correctional Population
per 100 serious crimes, right)
(share of the civilian
labour force, left)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The correctional population consists of adults in prison, 
in jail, on probation and on parole. For years prior to 1980, sys-
tematic data are available only for adults in prison and jail. For 
those earlier years, the total correctional population is estimated 
in two steps: first, by computing the average ratio between the 
total correctional population and the number of adults in prison 
and jail during the period 1980-1989 (=5.91); and second, by 
multiplying for each year the number of adults in prison and jail 
by this average ratio. The serious crime rate consists of Part I 
Index Crimes of the FBI Unified Crime Reporting (UCR) ex-
pressed in relation to the overall population. Part I Index Crimes 
include criminal homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated 
assault, burglary, larceny-theft and motor-vehicle theft. The last 
data points are 2010 for net change in correctional population 
and 2012 for unemployment.  
 
SOURCE: The correctional population is from Sourcebook of 
Criminal Justice Statistics Online (till 1979: Table 6.28.2009 
(http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/csv/t6282009.csv); from 
1980 onward: Table 6.1.2010 
(http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/csv/t612010.csv). The 
number of serious crimes (Part I Index Crime) is from UCR 
Online 
(http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/Search/Crime/State/StateCrime.cf
m for 1960-2005; http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-
in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10tbl01.xls for 
2006-2010). Unemployment till 1947 is from Historical Statis-
tics of the United States: Earliest Times to the Present, Millen-
nial Edition (online) (series code: Ba457); from 1948, data are 
from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics through Global Insight 
(series code: RUC@US). 
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Taking Stock 
 
What do these relationships mean for capital as power and for the limits on that power? To 
contextualize our conclusions, let us reiterate our earlier findings. In the 2010 Forum, we 
noted that this is not a regular crisis but a systemic crisis, and that it is not a crisis of 
production or finance, or of a mismatch between them, but a crisis of power. The ruling class, 
we said, is struck by systemic fear – that is, fear for the survival of capitalism. The 
reverberations of crime and punishment – including the recent Supreme Court order to 
release a quarter of California’s prisoners – may be signs of that fear.  
In the 2011 Forum, we outlined the objective ‘asymptotes of capitalist power’. The ruling 
class, we said, is fearful for a reason. The logic of capital as power is deterministic. It forces 
dominant capitalists to accumulate differentially and augment their power. They have no 
choice in this matter. They have to push toward the asymptotes of their power, relentlessly. 
And as they get closer to those asymptotes, their push elicits counter forces, making systemic 
collapse increasingly likely.  
Today we looked at the dark side this process – the side of resistance. In the past, most 
analyses of resistance were anchored in the productive process. The focus was on industrial 
strikes, workers, mass movements and political parties. This ‘materialist’ focus was 
subsequently challenged by the ethno-cultural revolution. Instead of the old myths of the 
enlightenment and socialism, there arose a new emphasis on power and postism. Subjective 
deconstruction substituted for history’s ‘laws of motion’. Determinism was discredited, but so 
was meaning and significance. 
Our own work breaks with this postist fashion. Autonomous resistance – such as the 
May 1968 uprising in France or the first Palestinian Intifada of 1987/8 – does not abide by 
the logic of capital and therefore cannot be analyzed from within that logic. But most 
resistance to capital as power is not autonomous, but heteronomous: it does not initiate – it 
responds; it is less an action and more a reaction; it is not external but integral to the conflictual 
logic of capital as power. In short, it is part and parcel of the capitalist mode of power, and 
that embeddedness makes it amenable to objective, deterministic inquiry.10  
In order to engage in such inquiry, though, we need to transcend the conventional frame 
of reference. Most critical researchers continue to separate the capitalist reality into 
‘production’ and ‘power’. In this framework, the labour market is part of the economy and 
accumulation, while the penal system is part of the state and the socio-political system more 
broadly. Rusche sought to challenge this view: he tried to analyze penality in relation to both 
production and discipline, and unemployment in relation to both criminality and the 
economy. But working within the Marxist frame of reference, he continued to think of 
capitalism as a mode of production. So his attempt, however ingenious, remained focused on 
material conditions and therefore was incomplete.  
From the viewpoint of capital as power, penality and unemployment are not distinct 
aspects of politics and economics, respectively. Instead, they are different forms of capitalized 
resistance and sabotage. Human creativity is a positive form of resistance to capitalist power, 
and the threat of unemployment is the means by which the ruling class tries to strategically 
sabotage and subjugate ity to capitalist ends. Similarly with crime and punishment. this creativ
                                                        
10 On the difference between the heteronomy of capital and the autonomy of resistance, see Jonathan 
Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, Capital as Power: A Study of Order and Creorder, RIPE Series in Global Po-
litical Economy, New York and London: Routledge, 2009, pp. 19-21. 
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Illegality is a negative form of resistance to capitalist power, and penality is the major 
institution that keeps this resistance from undermining the capitalist creorder.  
These forms of resistance and sabotage fit into the breadth and depth regimes of capital 
as power.11 In the past, we argued that during a depth phase, the sabotage of stagflation 
(stagnation and inflation) assists the process of ‘accumulation through crisis’.12 Now, since 
crime and punishment are tightly correlated with unemployment, we can see how this 
additional form of sabotage kicks in. During the depth phase of the 1970s and 1980s, 
unemployment and inflation increased, as did crime and punishment. Conversely, during the 
breadth phase of the 1990s, they all decreased.  
And here we come to the enigma of Figure 5. During the systemic crises of the 1930s and 
2000s, the tight correlation between penality and unemployment seems to have broken down: 
in both periods, the sabotage of unemployment rose sharply; yet crime and punishment, 
instead of rising in tandem, actually receded.  
What could explain this enigma? One possibility is that some of the data we use are 
incorrect or inaccurate. A second possibility is that our top-down presentation of the data is too 
crude, and that a more refined set of proxies for unemployment, crime and punishment will 
eliminate the anomaly. But there is also a third, substantive, possibility, and that is that 
systemic crises alter the rules of the game. These crises not only dent the resolve of the ruling 
class; they also change the class disposition of criminals. Under the system of ‘business as 
usual’ (including its cyclical crises), the poor feel that there is ‘no way out’. Without jobs, 
without dignity and with little prospect for change, the only alterative is crime. But during a 
deep, systemic crisis, there emerges another, transformational, alternative. This alternative is 
based not on individual alienation and protestation, but on class solidarity; not on defying the 
system but on altering its very structure. Perhaps it is the emergence of this democratic 
opening during a systemic crisis that causes crime to drop despite soaring unemployment.13 
  
                                                        
11 Jonathan Nitzan, ‘Regimes of Differential Accumulation: Mergers, Stagflation and the Logic of 
Globalization’, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2001, pp. 226-274. 
12 Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, The Global Political Economy of Israel. London: Pluto Press, 
2002. 
13 The third possibility was suggested to us by the Israeli criminologist, Professor Jacob Reuven.  
